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This introduction considers three themes that recur across the various contributions 
to this collection. The first is the nature of borders and how these have been affected 
by the increase in transnational collective action and  the growth in the power of 
transnational institutions. The second is the distinction between environmental 
movements and the social movement forms of environmentalism: meaning that not 
all forms of environmental movement are social movements. The third is the evidence 
of the diversity of environmentalisms, which leads us to identify three principal kinds 
of environmental movement, the postmaterial movements strongest in the USA and 
Australia, the postindustrial movements that are strongest in Europe and the 
postcolonial movements of the South.  
 
 
Reflection on the history of environmentalism since the debates about risk and limits 
to growth emerged in the early 1970s shows that transnational conflicts over power 
and ideology have been central from the beginning of the new environmental 
politics. Limits to growth and ‘overpopulation’ arguments that came mainly from the 
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North, while couched in terms of global humanity and nature, seemed to many in the 
South a further means by which the most powerful and wealthy countries could 
retain their control of the South Reflection of this kind also reminds us how quickly 
things have changed. Many environmental ideas that recently seemed marginal are 
now mainstream, and some environmental movement organisations previously seen 
as outsiders have become institutionalised in national and international policy 
making structures. This has led some to argue that the environmental movement is 
‘the most comprehensive and influential movement of our time’ (Castells 1997: 67) 
but we will argue here instead that it is more accurate to think of the environmental 
movement as still at an early stage in relation to shaping global politics. 
 
This collection of articles does not aim to provide a full overview of the nature of the 
environmental movement either in the form of its most important national cases or 
by assessing and explaining its impacts on national or international political systems. 
Environmental movements have grown too numerous and trans-national politics too 
complex for this to be feasible in one volume. Instead, the common focus is on 
understanding how transnational political processes affect what environmental 
movements can do, and why they choose to act as they do.  
 
In this introduction we reflect on three questions that recur across the various 
contributions to this collection. First, we clarify what we mean when we talk of 
transnational politics. Second, since environmental movements have diversified so 
much, we discuss what it means to define only some of them as social movements. 
Third, we assess what ideological differences between different groups reveal about 
how environmentalism is developing, particularly across the conceptual and 
geographical borders that divide North and South.  
 
Environmental movements, transnational politics and border thinking 
The new environmentalism of the 1970s was, from the beginning, global in its 
analysis, but there was very little evidence of global environmental protest action or 
of groups working effectively across borders. New organisations such as Greenpeace 
pursued direct action against national governments and companies that were causing 
environmental problems, but Greenpeace was and remains a Northern-based 
organisation with a strongly centralised structure. Furthermore it prefers to frame its 
campaigns in moral rather than ideological ways, and so has not been strongly 
associated with the new Global Justice movement. Other groups such as the World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) predated the new environmentalism but have adjusted 
to it to some degree, becoming in recent years advocates of sustainable development 
and tackling poverty as the best means to protect non-human nature (see Rootes, this 
volume). Nevertheless while the character of WWF does vary a little between 
countries, overall it is not a radical organisation either in the sense of engaging in 
regular protest, or in making arguments that challenge the political order. Of the 
three major international environmental non-governmental organisations only 
Friends of the Earth International (FoEI) has associated itself with the critique of 
neo-liberalism and aligned itself with the global justice movement.  But despite 
having member groups in seventy countries, FoEI has few financial resources 
compared to Greenpeace or WWF (see Doherty, this volume) and in that sense its 
international organisation is small relative to the others.  
 
Prior to the late 1990s, most national environmental organisations lacked either the 
money or the time to be able to engage in consistent international activity. However, 
there is evidence that transnational environmental action is on the increase. 
According to Bandy and Smith in 1973 there were 17 transnational social movement 
organisations (TSMOs) in the environmental field, whereas in 2000 that figure had 
risen to 167. Environmental groups made up 17% of  all TSMOs, second only to 
human rights groups at 26% (2005: 16).  Alongside this quantitative increase, which 
in part reflects the institutionalisation of environmentalism in the spread of formal 
organisations, there were also changes in environmental agendas. There is an 
increased ‘tendency for groups to adopt multi-issue rather than single issue frames 
for their struggles and groups were more likely to identify the linkages between 
issues such as between environmental protection and human rights…’ (2005: 16).  
Smith’s (2005) research on the spread of regional organisation in transnational social 
movements since the 1980s showed that groups in the South were more likely to 
retain ties with groups outside their regions than those in the North and valued being 
part of transnational networks. While, as Smith acknowledges and as we discuss 
below (see Doherty and Routledge, this volume; Doyle 2005 and Wood 2005), there 
are many ideological and organisational tensions between Northern and Southern 
groups involved in transnational alliances, Southern groups in Smith’s survey were 
positive about the benefits of trans-national alliances, since they provided them with 
resources and legitimacy. The cases of Madagascar, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Hungary analysed in this volume (see Duffy, Fagan and Kerényi and Szabó) reveal 
how trans-national alliances and rent-seeking behaviour can lead to organisations 
which are structured to meet the expectations of western funders. This may be an 
important extra part of the explanation for Smith’s findings on the growth of 
transnational networks. It is not surprising in the more radical networks such as 
People’s Global Action (PGA Routledge, this volume; Wood 2005) and FoEI that 
the internal power relations within the networks have been addressed most self-
consciously, although without pretending that these can be fully surmounted. Thus in 
examining the growth of TSMOs we need to be aware of the financial dependence 
on transnational funding of most environmental organisations outside the wealthiest 
countries.  
 
The growth of protest against global neo-liberalism has been the most important 
impetus for new attention to trans-national environmental politics. Prior to the 1990s 
the focus on global civil society in international relations was on the role of formally 
organised NGOs in policy-making as there was little transnational protest witnessed. 
When major trans-national protests against the ‘Washington Consensus’ and neo-
liberalism began in the late 1990s, however, this changed because these protests 
were new in important respects. There is a long history of transnational protest going 
back to the antislavery movements of the early nineteenth century, but  these were 
still rooted in national politics. Tarrow and della Porta (2005) argue that 
transnational politics took three forms. First, diffusion of ideas or actions from one 
country to another, as for instance in the way that sit-ins spread from the US Civil 
Rights Movement to European student movements in the 1960s; Second, the 
domestication within national politics of conflicts that had external origins, such as 
protests against national governments for accepting structural adjustment 
programmes imposed by international financial institutions.  Third, externalization, 
in which external institutions were challenged to intervene in domestic affairs, as in 
the advocacy coalitions through which Brazilian rubber tappers and NGOs worked 
with Northern environmental groups and put pressure on the World Bank to hold the 
Brazilian government to account for development projects in the Amazonian 
rainforests (Keck and Sikkink 1998). What is new in the recent and diverse multi-
national protests against neo-liberalism is that these protests target transnational 
institutions (including, but not limited to, the World Trade Organisation, the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) through coordinated 
transnational protests.. Thus, new transnational global justice networks of protest 
movements and social forums have been inspired by the evidence about 
unaccountable and unjust transnational sites of power. They are also facilitated by 
two further developments: first, the break up of the USSR has removed the tendency 
to see all post-1945 conflicts in bi-polar terms; second, cheaper communications in 
the form of phone and fax the Internet and email, have transformed the ease of 
transnational exchange of information and co-ordination of action. Also vital has 
been the reduced cost of air travel in facilitating face-to-face networking. While it is 
an uncomfortable truth for environmentalists given the contribution of air travel to 
CO2 emissions, face to face networking is vital to effective transnational 
campaigning as it is through sustained presence that the deeper relationships of trust 
and solidarity are most likely to develop. This was evident in the negotiation of a 
crisis of identity by key figures in FoEI  (see Doherty, this volume) and also allows 
cosmopolitan activists to cross borders regularly to engage in the kind of 
‘imagineering’ work that Routledge et al. (this volume) identify as essential for 
grassroots global justice networks.  
 
This is not, however, a book about the globalisation of environmentalism. There is 
no evidence of a single form of environmental movement emerging, nor of national 
borders becoming irrelevant. The analysis in this collection is linked by a concern 
with three questions raised about environmental movements in connection with new 
and older transnational forms of power. First, how do inequalities, including the 
legacy of colonialism, affect the context in which environmental movements work? 
This affects the power relations within transnational social movement  networks 
(such as FoEI and PGA Asia) and the governance networks that shape the 
opportunities available to environmental NGOs as in Madagascar and Bosnia. 
Second, how do different parts of national environmental movements engage with 
transnational institutions and what is the relationship between national bases of 
operation and transnational action? This is the focus of the contributions on Hungary, 
Britain and France. Third, in what ways do national and other borders remain 
significant? In respect of this question it is salutary to compare environmentalism in 
Iran and Burma (see Doyle and Simpson, this volume) with other cases examined in 
this collection. In Iran the Islamic government, as a means of improving 
environmental governance, has encouraged environmental NGOs, but they are not 
permitted to work as political groups in any way that might challenge the regime. 
When Iran held a major international environmental conference in 2005 it did not 
invite any NGOs from Iran or abroad in case they asked questions that the regime did 
not want to answer. In Burma the military regime has exploited its gas reserves at the 
expense of violent repression of ethnic and religious minorities. Resistance groups 
among the Karen peoples have developed the concept of ‘earth rights’ to describe 
how environmental and human rights are both being repressed. Environmentalism 
has crossed the borders of both countries, but the borders matter, regime types 
matter, and radical green ideas in both countries are accessible mainly through 
satellite broadcasts and websites run by dissident exiles.   
 
Mignolo (2000) has coined the term border thinking to describe how borders of 
various kinds, both national and social are altered by the transnational changes that 
we identified above. It is not that national borders disappear as transnational sites of 
power become more significant, but rather that they gain a new meaning in an era of 
increased transnational flows of people, finance and communications. The article on 
France by Hayes illustrates this well. Environmental protest in France has taken a 
novel turn to civil disobedience, following forms of protest that were common a few 
years earlier in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Yet, rather than direct diffusion from 
other countries, which is, as Hayes says, probably minimal, what matters most in 
France is how these forms of protest were redefined in French Republican terms. 
Thus destroying GM crops is for Jose Bové, the internationally famous leader of the 
Confédération paysanne (CP), a form of ‘civic’, as opposed to civil, disobedience. 
He frames this citizenship as a call on the national state to protect aspects of French 
culture, in which food and its production loom large, against the flattening forces of 
neo-liberalism by standing up to the World Trade Organisation and refusing to grow 
or import GM products. Trans-national political forces were at issue in this case but 
they were not unchanged by crossing borders. Thus we still need comparative 
national analyses because even when environmental movements in different 
countries are subject to the same global forces, they do not all react in the same way. 
In this volume comparisons between Bosnia and Madagascar show that in both cases 
trans-national networks of governance have imposed environmental policies based 
on mistaken assumptions about the weakness of local civil society, but also that each 
differs because of nationally specific conditions. 
 
Given the unevenness of environmental movements, differences between movements 
and the importance of power relations between them, we are cautious about the use 
of the terminology ‘global civil society’ to describe the transnational networks 
developing between environmental groups. This is partly on historic grounds, since 
as is well known, even if there are new forms of transnational power, anti-colonial 
and post-colonial movements have always worked trans-nationally. The anti-
apartheid movement (AAM) is a good example of a movement that crossed borders, 
even while South Africa was a closed society for most of its population (Thörn 
2006). The AAM  began in the early 1960s before the emergence of the New Left, to 
which some trace the origins of the Northern movements in the new transnational 
contention. The better accounts of global civil society include recognition of this 
long historic context (Keane 2003, Edwards and Gaventa 2001).  But to us, global 
civil society still suggests a stronger and abstracted unity than seems to be evident 
given the differences within and the limits, as yet, of transnational environmentalism. 
We prefer the term used by Torgerson in his article in this collection (see also 
Torgerson 1999) - the green public sphere. The key point about the public sphere is 
that it is a space of dialogue and debate and does not presuppose a unified movement 
or society simply in need of a single common strategy. One point of criticism of the 
concept of public sphere is that its Republican origins seem to privilege the abstract 
public citizen, disembodied from bodily characteristics or historic influences (Iris 
Marion Young 2002). Torgerson, however, like Nancy Fraser (1990) argues that 
public spheres can be multiple rather than a single transnational space. Thus in his 
article here, he identifies a postcolonial dimension to environmentalism which needs 
to be addressed within the public spheres that are constituted by debates between 
environmentalists across borders. This is a theme we will return to below. Next, 
however, we need to explain what we mean by the terms environmental movement 
and social movement. How these terms are defined theoretically is important for the 
task of explaining the differences between different kinds of environmental 
movement. 
 
The social movement in environmental movements 
The concept of social movement is an analytical construct not a description of a given 
empirical phenomenon. There is no clear consensus on how to use the term and so at 
best the criteria that various definitions set out provide a heuristic device, which we 
argue can be used as a Weberian ideal type to understand and interpret real cases. This 
means that we should not accept at face value that all groups that call themselves 
environmental are necessarily part of a single environmental social movement.  
 
We identify four elements characteristic of social movements. First, a movement must 
have some common identity which is not simply based on ideas, but also expressed in  
the taken for granted practices and culture developed over time by participants in 
collective action  (what Bourdieu calls its habitus). Social movements in this sense are 
not momentary coalitions but develop their collective identity over time as they face 
the question of defining ‘who are we?’ ’what do we believe?’ and ‘how should we 
act?’ A second feature of social movements is that we can assess who is in the 
movement empirically by assessing its network ties as opposed to membership of 
organisations. Put most straightforwardly, movement involvement requires regular 
interaction with others. Mapping this through network ties can show which groups 
and individuals take common action or exchange ideas or resources. This means that 
we can also distinguish between more or less active and central and peripheral actors 
in the movement.. A focus on networks also means that there is no type of 
organisation that defines a social movement. Movement organisations  can be 
hierarchical and centralised, or the opposite. Or, as in the environmental movement, 
and the transnational networks examined by Routledge et al, they can be a 
combination of both. A third feature is that parts of this movement network are 
involved in public protest, which we regard as essential to the public political 
dimension of movement action, although this can also be combined with counter-
cultural lifestyles. The fourth criterion is that movements challenge some feature of 
dominant cultural codes or social and political values. In short, they argue for social 
and political change that goes beyond policy change. Social movements are therefore 
radical and this means that they can be of the left or the right. I In the social 
movement parts of the environmental movement, however, the influence of the left-
wing heritage has been over-whelming (Doherty 2002).  
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This is a complicated definition since we have to apply four criteria separately to 
actual groups that are in the process of constant change.  Also, different analysts of 
movements tend to give different weight  in applying these criteria  to empirical cases.  
For instance, we argue that network ties alone are not enough to define the movement 
as many groups can take joint action against the same targets without developing a 
common identity. Groups that develop common frames and culture through regular 
interaction, however, can develop common identity, over time. We give more weight 
than others to questions of collective identity, but because we also stress the challenge 
to dominant cultural codes, and use of protest, in relation to the environmental 
movement, we see the strongest social movement dimensions in the more radical and 
self-consciously ideological environmental groups. In contrast, Rootes defines the 
identity of the environmental movement broadly as a common commitment to the 
importance of environmental concern (2004: 612) – which entails a very inclusive 
definition of the environmental movement able to include groups that never take 
protest action, and do not challenge the political order ideologically. These are clearly 
not black and white questions and exist on a continuum: the observer has to decide 
not only whether a movement has a collective identity and interacts, but what degree 
of interaction and evidence of shared ideas are required  
 
The emphasis on critique as central to social movements is part of the European 
tradition of social movement theory associated with seeking to understand why new 
social movements emerged in the wake of the New Left (Melucci 1996). It can be 
contrasted with a more nominalist approach to explaining social movements with its 
origins in the USA which focused on understanding how they mobilise and explain 
patterns of protest (Tarrow 1998).  These are not so much different theories of social 
movements as approaches to different questions about collective action: the European 
tradition emphasising understanding ideology in relation to social structure; the US 
tradition focused on explaining specific protest actions. Thus, while the application of 
the term social movement remains contested, it is quite possible to draw on both 
European and US traditions in social movement theory and remain consistent. 
 
What does this understanding of social movement mean in relation to the 
environmental movements that are discussed in this volume? First, we argue that not 
all environmental groups have strong elements of a social movement. Kerényi and 
Szabó describe the predominance in Hungary of a narrow single-issue 
environmentalism in the 1990s, which became completely integrated into the new 
structures of government and failed to develop any capacity to mobilise an 
environmental constituency. In 2004 new groups and more radical ideas emerged 
through a protest campaign to protect a valued hill (Zengõ) from being damaged for a 
NATO military site. This campaign included urban environmental activists with ties 
to global justice groups in other countries and the Hungarian branch of Friends of the 
Earth, which was able to use its international network contacts to put pressure on 
NATO and the EU. Using our approach it could be said that the parts of the 
Hungarian environmental movement that participated in the Zengõ campaign 
increased their social movement dimensions. In contrast, in Iran, the narrow and state 
approved confines within which nearly all environmental NGOs are required to 
operate, is a good example of why not all environmental groups have a social 
movement dimension.  
 
A second consequence of this approach to social movements is that it makes 
allowance for the diversity of environmentalisms. Not all those engaged in 
environmental action are necessarily part of the same social movement. It is only to 
the degree that they interact regularly, taking joint action and discussing and revising 
their common identity, that groups are part of the same movement. Thus social 
movements are not fixed entities with stable memberships and fixed ideologies but are 
constituted through ongoing debate and interaction. Nor are organisations or groups 
necessarily always definable only as part of a single social movement. The 
Confédération paysanne, as discussed by Hayes, is part of an international radical 
farmers’ network known as La Via Campesina, as well as being part of global justice 
networks, particularly in the European social forum. CP members took action with 
those who defined themselves as greens,  in France against GM crops and may be 
developing a shared identity through regular joint  action. However, in general it 
makes sense to define the CP as taking environmental action without being central to 
the French environmental movement. PGA Asia is part of an even broader coalition: 
like other branches of People’s Global Action, the participants are linked through 
their opposition to neo-liberalism. However, the process of debate within the PGA 
network is helping to define both a movement culture and a common identity, hence 
the emphasis that Routledge et al. place on the work of those individuals who seek to 
push the movement to keep debating. In Burma, groups from the Karen people were 
driven by the brutality of the Burmese army to define the harm they experienced in 
ways that combined damage to the environment with the violence meted out to their 
people. This led to ties with a variety of international networks of indigenous peoples, 
human rights and environmental groups. Again, these links with other groups are too 
complex to define simply as either environmental or human rights. 
 
In the conclusion to this volume, we develop the emphasis on the importance of the 
differences between forms of environmental action further, making a general and 
more normative distinction between emancipatory environmental groups and 
governance environmental groups. The emancipatory environmental groups 
necessarily have a strong social movement dimension, although it does not follow that 
all social movement groups are emancipatory. The governance groups are those that 
offer no challenge to environmental injustice and are in general reproducing forms of 
inequality through their participation with governments, financial institutions and 
transnational corporations in transnational structures of governance. One example 
discussed by Duffy  is groups such as Conservation International that seek to move 
people out of national parks in the South, using their influence with international 
financial institutions to pressure Southern governments to adopt this policy. All of this 
suggests the need to separate out the empirical phenomena of organisations and 
groups that call themselves environmental from the social movement dimension in 
environmentalism. The latter can be found across diverse social movements and in 
different forms across and beyond borders. If social movement environmentalism is 
much more diverse than it was 30 years ago, are there any ways to understand its 
principal forms? It is to this question that we turn in the final section. 
 
North-South or Three Posts? 
When the ECPR workshop -  the forerunner to this special edition - was originally 
proposed by us,  a major aim  was to investigate differences, similarities and 
transnational crossovers between environmentalists operating in those opposing 
hemispheres of geopolitical imagination: North and South. Much of our discussion in 
the workshop showed that this division was overly simplified. Not only is the South 
too diverse to be easily defined in terms of shared experience, but also other regions 
such as the post-socialist states do not fit easily under either heading. And yet, in the 
absence of any other way of mapping major differences between ‘the West and the 
rest’, this theme remains an important one ‘after the fact’, as it were, in the revised 
versions of these articles.   
 
The contributors use the terms North/South, First World/Third Worlds, 
developed/developing worlds, and minority/majority worlds interchangeably. Most of 
these dualistic divisions are oriented around poverty and development issues. We 
acknowledge that all these terms are imperfect categories. It is a problem to define 
entire hemispheres as being rich and poor. There is huge variance in levels of poverty 
in countries classified as part of the South. Sometimes, the World Bank uses the term 
‘Fourth World’ to differentiate between the poorest nations and the simply poor 
nations of the Third World. On other occasions, it has taken out the oil-rich nations of 
the Middle East from its ‘South’ categorisation. There are also classification problems 
when considering recently industrialising countries versus those who are yet to 
undergo significant industrialisation. In some ways, one can follow the advice of the 
Calverts in their text devoted to discussions of the environment and North-South and 
simply say that the South is ‘taken to mean all the countries of the world not defined 
as Advanced Industrial Countries (AICs)’ (Calvert and Calvert 1999: 6). The problem 
with this approach, as Calvert et al accept, is that enormous discrepancies of wealth 
exist within nation-states. In the Australian aboriginal situation, for example, with 
indigenous peoples living a fourth world existence within a first world nation-state, it 
becomes obvious that the South can exist within the North. Of course, the opposite is 
also true: elites in the South can enjoy wealthy lives akin to what is generically 
expected in the North.  Another example is found in the United States: the forest 
preservation movements of the North West of the United States most obviously 
comprise a minority world environmental movement; whilst the U.S. environmental 
justice movement, born in communities of colour, originally in deliberate 
juxtaposition to what it perceived as the ‘white elite’ environmental movement, can 
be usefully designated as a majority world experience. In any study of social 
movements, terminology must be employed which is not wholly based on a discourse 
relating to nation-states for, as aforementioned, social movements often traverse 
nation-state boundaries.  
 
Of course, as already stated, this is an overly dualistic and simplistic, but useful 
broad-brush technique of highlighting differences. It is reminicient of Guha and 
Martinez-Alier’s construction of the ‘environmentalism of the poor’ (Guha and 
Martinez-Aliez 1997) as distinct from that of the wealthy. On the one hand, the 
environmentalism of the minority world is constructed as largely post-materialist: 
more interested in the rights of ‘other nature’, which are implicit in conservation, 
threatened species and wilderness campaigns. Contrarily, the issues we have 
described above, far from being post-materialist, are issues for survival. Elsewhere, 
Doyle (2005) uses this simple dichotomy of the minority world and the majority 
world. One criticism levelled at this work, as well as that of Guha and Martinez-Aliez, 
is that it unfairly and inaccurately represents green concerns in many parts of the 
industrialised world.  
 
In the minority countries of the New World – particularly the USA  and Australia - 
there can be no doubt that post-materialist issues have dominated environmental 
agendas over the past generation. The political ecology movements of western 
Europe, which combined post-materialism with a broader New Left-derived analysis 
of power developed a significantly different green ideology, and alongside traditional 
nature conservation issues, wrestled with questions of structural change and multiple 
forms of social inequality (gender, race, sexuality and class, and bureaucracy), from 
their inception. In   the USA and Australia these issues were in a subservient position 
to post-material environmental issues, which have been interpreted in a particularly 
apolitical manner by the largest environmental organisations (Dowie, 1995; Brulle 
and Jenkins 2006). Building on the North-South dualism, it may be more accurate to 
construct a tripartite system of characterisation for contemporary environmentalism: 
postindustrialism – depicting the European traditions of political ecology; 
postmaterialism – depicting the largely non-anthropocentric concerns of nature 
conservation which have dominated in the New World; and postcolonialism – 
descriptive of the experience of the majority of the earth: the South. 
 
Environmentalism, then, crosses a vast range of theoretical material. It can be 
understood in a post-materialist frame, championing the politics of ‘other nature’; the 
protection of wilderness areas; and the saving of threatened species. Through a post-
industrialist lens, environmentalism challenges the excesses of the industrialist 
project; the rights of corporations to pollute and degrade; and the dwindling of the 
earth’s resources as they are fed into the advanced industrial machines. Using post-
colonialism as the narrative frame, green concerns are caste in the light of the 
coloniser versus the colonised; the dichotomous world of affluence and poverty; along 
structuralist lines between the haves and the have-nots. In different parts of the world, 
these frames, or story lines – and combinations of them and others – are used more 
often to explain the causes and effects of environmental issues and problems. In the 
South, the frames of post-colonialism and structuralism usually dominate. In many 
parts of Europe, post-industrialism is deep-seated; whereas in New World cultures in 
North America and Australia, post-materialism, can usually be employed to interpret 
environmental politics. 
 
Traditional social movement models based on Marxist – and most particularly 
structuralist – accounts of power enjoy enormous currency in the South. As the article 
by Routledge (this volume) testifies, large numbers of environmental activists in the 
developing world identify themselves as Marxists, seeing the key cause of 
environmental degradation being that resources and production are in the hands of a 
ruling class. Solving these problems does not lie necessarily in better management or 
more efficient and sustainable practices. Rather, the first part of the answer lies in 
local people gaining control over their own resources, their own lives. 
 
Unlike some forms  of postmodern and post-positivist analysis, then, we still find the 
binary mega-division between majority and minority worlds – though imperfect - a 
useful one, as it continues to match and describe the ‘empirical reality’ as we have 
encountered it; as long as it is understood that these great divisions are neither 
necessarily geographically-oriented, nor nation-state specific. Rather, there is an 
immense gulf in the context of comparative environmental movements between the 
experiences of the majority of the earth’s people (the South), when contrasted with 
those encountered by a small minority (the North). A rather simple, often quoted, 
equation needs to be spelt out here. Approximately 80% of the Earth’s resources are 
either consumed or owned by approximately 15% of the Earth’s people. On the other 
hand 85% of the Earth’s people have access to only 20% of the Earth’s resources 
(Doyle and McEachern 1998).  
 
But no sooner do we arrange some neat form of tripartite categorisation, than 
environmental movements, with their almost pathological need to cross borders - 
whether they be conceptual, cultural or geographical - make nonsense out of such 
feeble positivist attempts to understand what is a diverse and changing phenomenon. 
Movements have sought to work across these divides. In Doherty’s, Rootes’, Hayes’ 
and Routledge’s articles, mention is made of the Global Justice Movement which 
intersects with social movement environmentalism; demanding that the South must 
gain fair and equitable access to resources; challenging the over-consumption patterns 
of the North; whilst also critiquing ways in which Northern development interests act 
in ways which maintain the dependency of the South. Yet such border crossings do 
not create a pure sphere of transnational civil society. Contributions to this collection 
and others have examined how transnational networks reproduce inequalities, even in 
those most committed to challenging them (Anheier and Themudo 2002 Bob 2001).   
 
Indeed, one of the critical traits which Calvert et al list as a characteristic of the South 
is the fact that almost all states are former colonies. This element of colonisation is 
taken up by Doug Torgerson in this edition. He agrees that an image of a ‘divided 
planet’ in terms of rich and poor, or ‘Eurocentric planet’ is a needed correction to the 
concept espoused by Ward and Dubos’ Only One Earth, commissioned for the 
UNCED Conference in 1972. Torgerson goes further, arguing that the divisions of the 
planet bear the ‘unmistakeable mark of the legacy of colonialisation’ , and ‘as 
concerns are voiced from formerly colonised regions of the divided planet, the many 
environmentalisms tend to converge in the focus with the Global Justice Movement, a 
“movement of movements”’.  
 
One of the trends to emerge from green globalisation has been for Northern groups to 
attempt to incorporate those very different concerns expressed by their Southern 
compatriots. There is no doubt that increasingly, diverse interpretations of green 
identity are under increasing pressures to homogenise. This issue will be developed 
more fully later when we address the concept of global green public sphere. But we 
must accept that, despite these recent trends at conceptualising and sharing grand 
green narratives, the actual environmental issues on the ground are profoundly 
different in the South than the North. Movements, therefore, which surface in 
countries like India, Bangladesh, Chile or Somalia – in the majority world - will be 
more oriented around issues of environmental security: that is, the rights of people to 
gain access to the fundamental resources for survival: air, water, earth, and fire. The 
most pressing environmental issues in the Indian Ocean region, for example, 
comprising one-third of all the peoples on the earth, are almost all anthropocentric: 
people fighting for food and water security; struggling for adequate admission to a 
market which provides health care and adequate shelter; providing a society to live in 
which is not consistently ravaged by wars – such as Afghanistan, Palestine or Angola 
– and wave after wave of colonialism, in all its forms, creates catastrophic tsunamis of 
human-making - (Doyle and Risely 2007). Whereas, in many parts of the North these 
issues, however compassionately understood, are literally worlds apart from the lives 
of the wealthy minority, most of whom will only ever experience the lives of the 
majority – what Toffler (1971) calls the Living Dead – through the vicarious 
experiences offered by travel and lifestyle programs on television and the internet. 
 
As aforesaid, after more than thirty years of new environmentalisms we are still only 
at the beginning of addressing the fundamental environmental problems, which are as 
rooted in transnational structures of power as they were three decades ago. The key 
difference is that new transnational structures of governance have split environmental 
movements between those that have become governance movements, intergrated into 
policy making, and those that remain closer to social movement and emancipatory 
forms of environmentalism.  
 
Order of Exposition 
Let us now out outline the order of specific contributions presented in this volume, 
and briefly review the content and argumentation included in each chapter.  
 
Torgerson addresses the nature of postcolonial thinking about the environment and 
argues for the need to recognise postcolonial political ecology as a distinct part of the 
green public sphere. Recognition of this means greater attention to the inescapable 
conflicts that divide green politics. But he also argues that the challenges ‘to the tenets 
that nature is to be dominated and the earth, conquered’ provide a basis on which a 
postcolonial political ecology can develop. The volume then examines three cases 
from the South. Duffy’s analysis of the interaction of international NGOs, 
international financial institutions and local NGOs in Madagascar demonstrates the 
importance of structural power and the power of transnational institutions over a 
Southern government, but it also shows how a limited form of autonomy has been 
carved out by local NGOs even within the neo-liberal confines of the ‘governance 
state’. Environmental groups in Burma and Iran are compared by Doyle and Simpson. 
Both Iran and Burma are authoritarian and repressive regimes, but the structure of 
power of each regime is different. In Burma the state’s territory is less effectively 
controlled by the military dictatorship and repression is used to control resistance 
groups, including those who oppose the regime’s environmentally and socially 
catastrophic energy export projects. In Iran, the regime encourages apolitical forms of 
environmental organisations that function as a release valve for parts of civil society.  
 
Rootes then, explains how the three British environmental organisations most oriented 
towards global agendas differ in their approach WWF UK has become increasingly 
committed to an agenda of sustainable development, which enables it to work both 
with government, business and with other institutionalised environmental and 
development organisations. FoE has adopted a more ideological agenda of 
transnational environmental justice, which has been influenced by its stronger ties 
with other non-environmental organisations. Greenpeace, originally the organisation 
with the most international focus has changed least, since its strategy is to work less 
through coalitions and to avoid broad ideological commitments in favour of clearly 
specified issue based campaigns. 
 
The next three contributions examine other national environmental movements in 
Europe that differ in that each case is characterised by a progressively stronger green 
public sphere. In Bosnia, external funding after the civil war has been directed to the 
creation of civil society groups, but the result has been the creation of the kinds of 
organisations best suited to meeting the rubric of funding regimes. These are groups 
of technical specialists who tend to avoid political controversy and debate over 
environmental principles and have stronger ties with funding agencies than with 
Bosnian publics. This side of Bosnian environmental governance has many 
similarities with Madagascar. Although political authority is fragmented in Bosnia, 
Fagan argues that the policy that drives reconstruction mistakenly assumes that 
Bosnians never had a capacity to mobilise on issues such as the environment. The 
case study of a local environmental campaign shows that grassroots environmental 
groups can work in Bosnia, but these are not the groups that get funded.  
 
Bosnia and Hungary, provide evidence that post-socialist states do not automatically 
follow a western path to modernisation, contrary to the assumptions of many policy 
makers. In Hungary, according to Kerényi and Szabó, environmentalism was a major 
part of the opposition to the Communist Party in the later years of the regime. This 
‘heroic moment’ did not translate into a strong post-socialist environmental 
movement as after 1989 environmentalism was fragmented and institutionalised 
through funding regimes from the USA and EU.. It was after EU accession in 2004 
that a new kind of environmentalism developed in Hungary through the campaign to 
defend Zengõ hill. An ideologically diverse coalition of urban counter-cultural greens, 
local people and transnational environmental organizations was able to pressure the 
national government through the EU and NATO, to change its plans.  
 
France has a stronger history of protest than Hungary and Bosnia, and has seen new 
forms of protest develop that reflect the decline of the organised left in recent years. 
In relation to the environment, this has taken the form of ‘civic disobedience’ by 
diverse and partly overlapping networks of activists in defence of trees, against gas 
guzzling 4x4 cars, and against GM crops. Although similar repertoires have 
developed in other countries, the way in which they are justified and used in France is 
distinctive, insofar as this takes place with reference to French Republican values and 
against externally imposed neo-liberalism.  
 
The final two cases examine cases of transnational networking. Routledge, Cumbers 
and Nativel compare two contrasting international networks that play a role in the 
global justice movement: People’s Global Action (PGA) Asia and the European arm 
of the International Federation of Chemical, Energy and Mining Workers (ICEM). 
Neither network would usually be classified as part of the environmental movement 
although  both campaign  on environmental issues. Including them here is consistent 
with our argument that social movement environmentalism can also be found in 
groups outside those usually defined as the environmental movement. PGA Asia is a 
network of predominantly peasant movements ‘engaged in struggles for land and 
water rights, food sovereignty, economic and cultural survival, and environmental 
sustainability’ while the ICEM is engaged in campaigns for environmental regulation 
in industries that are key sources of environmental problems.  A central role in 
constituting both these  networks is played by ‘imagineers’: key activists, who have to 
relate the international work to the realities of the daily struggles of the grassroots 
groups that work principally at local level. The latter often find it difficult to see the 
relevance of international networking. This means that the success of transnational 
emancipatory networks depends on how successfully the imagineers are able to link 
transnational social movement work to that rooted in local places. This is in some 
ways also the challenge for Friends of the Earth International (FOEI). FOEI is a loose 
federation of 71 national FoE groups with very different histories, resources and 
national contexts. Doherty examines how FoEI faced major divisions on North-South 
questions. Many other transnational social movement networks have also found 
North-South differences hard to overcome. For FoEI this was particularly important 
because it had built its common identity on a commitment to global environmental 
justice. It was able to resolve differences because the key actors had developed a 
distinctive culture and relationships of trust over regular international meetings. The 
key challenge for FoEI is to whether it can work effectively in practice despite 
differences of power and ideology between national groups, which it is unlikely to be 
able to overcome completely.  
 
The concluding chapter draws out from the volume a split between logics of 
emancipation and logics of governance in the actions of the diverse environmental 
groups dealt with in the different contributions to the volume. Ultimately, we 
conclude that the transnational politics of modern environmentalism takes place 
within and without social movement frames and, as such, can be understood 
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